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ABSTRACT: This paper shows that several sorts of expressions
cannot be interpreted metaphorically, including determiners, tenses, etc. Generally, functional categories cannot be interpreted
metaphorically, while lexical categories can. This reveals a semantic property of functional categories, and it shows that metaphor
can be used as a probe for investigating them. It also reveals an
important linguistic constraint on metaphor. The paper argues
this constraint applies to the interface between the cognitive systems for language and metaphor. However, the constraint does
not completely prevent structural elements of language from being
available to the metaphor system. The paper shows that linguistic structure within the lexicon, specifically, aspectual structure, is
available to the metaphor system.
This paper takes as its starting point an observation about which sorts
of expressions can receive metaphorical interpretations. Surprisingly,
there are a number of expressions that cannot be interpreted metaphorically. Quantifier expressions (i.e. determiners) provide a good example.
Consider a richly metaphorical sentence like:
(1)

Read o’er the volume of young Paris’ face, And find delight
writ there with beauty’s pen; Examine every married lineament
(Romeo and Juliet I.3).

2

In appreciating Shakespeare’s lovely use of language, writ and pen are
obviously understood metaphorically, and married lineament must be
too. (The meanings listed in the Oxford English Dictionary for lineament
include diagram, portion of a body, and portion of the face viewed with
respect to its outline.) In spite of all this rich metaphor, every means
simply every, in its usual literal form. Indeed, we cannot think of what
a metaphorical interpretation of every would be.
As we will see, this is not an isolated case: while many expressions can be interpreted metaphorically, there is a broad and important
group of expressions that cannot. Much of this paper will be devoted
to exploring the significance of this observation. It shows us something
about metaphor. In particular, it shows that there is a non-trivial linguistic constraint on metaphor. This is a somewhat surprising result,
as one of the leading ideas in the theory of metaphor is that metaphor
comprehension is an aspect of our more general cognitive abilities, and
not tied to the specific structure of language.
The constraint on metaphor also shows us something about linguistic meaning. We will see that the class of expressions that fail to have
metaphorical interpretations is a linguistically important one. Linguistic items are often grouped into two classes: lexical categories, including nouns, verbs, etc., and functional categories, including determiners
(quantifier expressions), tenses, etc. Generally, we will see that lexical
categories can have metaphorical interpretations, while functional ones
cannot. This reveals something about the kinds of semantic properties
these expressions can have. It also shows that we can use the availability of metaphorical interpretation as a kind of probe, to help distinguish
these sorts of categories.
Functional categories are often described as ‘structural elements’ of
language. They are the ‘linguistic glue’ that holds sentences together,
and so, their expressions are described as being semantically ‘thin’. Our
metaphor probe will give some substance to this (often very rough-andready) idea. But it raises the question of whether all such structural
elements in language—anything we can describe as ‘linguistic glue’—
are invisible when it comes to metaphorical interpretation. We will see
that this is not so. In particular, we will see that linguistic structure
that can be found within lexical items may be available to metaphorical
interpretation. This paper will show specifically that so-called aspec-
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tual structure, which language uses to encode certain ways of depicting
events in a linguistically structured way, is available to the cognitive
system responsible for metaphor interpretation.
The picture that will emerge from this discussion is that the cognitive system involved in metaphor is highly selective in how it accesses
linguistic structure. It can uniformly ignore certain structural elements,
including functional categories; while at the same time it can access
other structural elements, like aspectual structure.
This paper will proceed as follows. Section 1 will show that determiners cannot be interpreted metaphorically. Section 2 will generalize
this observation, to show that while the lexical categories can be interpreted metaphorically, the functional categories cannot. This section
will also explore the ways this allows us to use metaphor as a probe for
investigating the linguistic notion of functional category. Section 3 will
turn to the question of how to understand the constraint on metaphor
our observation about functional categories indicates. It will argue that
it is best understood as a constraint on the interface between the cognitive systems involved in language and metaphor. Section 4 will explore
the extent of this constraint. It will show that some aspects of linguistic
structure are available to the metaphor system. In particular, features
of linguistic structure within the lexicon are. Finally, section 5 will offer
some conclusions and speculations.

1. SOME MISSING METAPHORS

I shall begin by showing that certain categories of expressions lack
metaphorical interpretations. This section will focus on determiners.
In section 2 we will see that all expressions falling under functional
categories lack metaphorical interpretations.
Along the way, I shall try to remain as neutral as possible about the
notion of metaphor itself. We will have clear enough examples to know
it when we see it, and will not need a fleshed out theory of metaphor
to identify and work with the constraints this paper will propose. However, we will need to be a little more clear on just what we mean by a
part of a sentence having or lacking a metaphorical interpretation. Before presenting the main evidence about determiners, I shall pause to
clarify this point. (I shall return to more general issues about metaphor
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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briefly in section 3.)
1.1.

Metaphors Derived from Parts of a Sentence

Some metaphors may be localized to particular parts of a sentence.
We can see this in the stock example of a metaphor in philosophical
discussion—the much overused:
(2)

Juliet is the sun.

In interpreting this sentence metaphorically, we typically understand
Juliet as meaning Juliet. It contributes its literal meaning to the metaphor. But we do not understand sun as simply contributing its literal
meaning. Rather, it triggers a metaphorical interpretation involving
being radiant, a source of warmth, etc. In understanding the whole
sentence (or an utterance of it) metaphorically, we thus localize the
metaphorical content to sun, but take Juliet literally. In such a case, as
I shall say, sun receives a metaphorical interpretation, while Juliet does
not.1
A few provisos are in order about how I shall use this notion of
metaphorical interpretation, mostly to point out that I mean something
rather weak. First, I am not supposing that there is any such thing
as a special species of metaphorical meanings that attach directly to
linguistic items (or denying it either, for that matter). All I need to
suppose is that expressions in a sentence play an important role in our
coming to comprehend a metaphor, and that in some cases, that role
sets up a mapping from an expression to its literal meaning, and in
some cases to something very different from its literal meaning.2
Second, I make no claim about what the primary unit of metaphorical interpretation is, and particularly, no claim that it is subsentential. It
is compatible with what I have noted that it is whole utterances, in contexts, that are the primary bearers of metaphorical interpretation (and
this appears to be the standard assumption). I have only noted that
when we do interpret an utterance, we can often localize metaphorical
interpretation to parts of the sentence uttered, and isolate some parts
that contribute only their literal interpretations.
To reinforce this, it is worth noting that whether or not a part of a
sentence is interpreted literally or metaphorically is dependent on the
context. Consider an example from Stern (2000):
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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A revolution is not a matter of inviting people to dinner. (Attributed to Mao Tse-Tung.)

c. My salad days, When I was green in judgment: cold in
blood (Anthony and Cleopatra I.5).

If indeed Mao said this, it is likely that it was to be understood with
revolution taking its literal meaning. (For Mao, revolution really meant
revolution!) The locus of metaphorical content is in the phrase inviting
people to dinner. If I say the same thing to my fiancée while planning a
dinner party, this latter phrase would be interpreted literally, and presumably revolution would require a metaphorical interpretation.

Many more examples may be found in any extensive list of metaphors,
such as that in Lakoff and Johnson (1980). We easily find a variety of
metaphors localized to the major lexical categories.

1.2.

Metaphorical Interpretations of Major Lexical Categories

Now that we have a notion of the metaphorical interpretation of a part
of a sentence, we can ask what sorts of expressions have metaphorical
interpretations.
A quick glance shows that we can readily find metaphorical interpretations across all the major lexical categories. These are the categories
of nouns, verbs, and adjectives (adverbs being assimilated to the category of adjectives). Here are some examples, including more poetic
metaphors (usually drawn from Shakespeare) and more conventional
ones.
• Nouns:
(4)

a. Juliet is the sun (Romeo and Juliet II.2).
b. Girls are sugar and spice.

• Verbs:
(5)

a. His mother’s death hit him hard.
b. He hardened his heart.
c. He that depends Upon your favours swims with fins of
lead (Coriolanus I.1).

• Adjectives:
(6)

a. The painting is blue.
b. That idea is transparent.

www.thebalticyearbook.org

1.3.

Determiners Lack Metaphorical Interpretation

When we look at the major lexical categories, we find metaphorical interpretations easily. But there are some categories where we find none.
I have already mentioned the example of determiners. These are expressions like every, some, most, few, etc., that express quantification,
and are interpreted as generalized quantifiers in standard semantic theory.3
Determiners do not receive metaphorical interpretations. Consider
a few examples:
(7)

a. Thou, best of dearest and mine only care, Art left the prey
of every vulgar thief (Sonnet 48).
b. It is the star to every wandering bark (Sonnet 116).
c. Read o’er the volume of young Paris’ face, And find delight
writ there with beauty’s pen; Examine every married lineament (Romeo and Juliet I.3, repeated from 1).
d. When the blood burns, how prodigal the soul Lends the
tongue vows. These blazes, daughter, Giving more light
than heat, extinct in both (Hamlet I.3).

In each of these cases, we have a rich metaphor. But in each case, the
determiner is not interpreted metaphorically. Each occurrence of every
in (7) means every, literally. The same for more. These examples are
typical of what we see when we go hunting for metaphorical interpretations for these expressions. We can find lots of metaphors in which
determiners appear, but none where they themselves get metaphorical
interpretations.
I have been careful to put this claim in terms of the grammatical
category of determiner, rather than more loosely in terms of quantifier
expressions. This turns out to be important, both to get the claim right,
and for a generalization we will explore in a moment.
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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The claim I am advancing is that there are no metaphorical interpretations of determiners. This needs to be distinguished from a few
others for which it might be mistaken. First, the claim is that there are
no metaphorical interpretations of determiners. There are other figurative interpretations which are possible. We can find irony or over- or
under-statement (or if you like the traditional names, hyperbole and
meiosis) with determiners. For instance:
(8)

a. Like, MOST things he says are true.
b. I saw every famous philosopher at the conference.

This does require us to have a clear enough sense of what counts as a
metaphor to distinguish it from other sorts of figures. In these sorts of
cases, though, that is not too demanding. We see in (8) cases where the
quantifying determiner (most or every) functions with its basic meaning intact. In (8a) the utterance is then interpreted as conveying the
opposite of what it normally expresses. In (8b), the over-stated usage
is generated by picking a stronger quantifier than is really appropriate.
The utterance conveys something like that the speaker saw some famous philosophers, with an emphasis generated by the exaggeration.
In none of these cases do we provide anything like a metaphorical interpretation of the determiner itself.
Second, we do find metaphorical interpretations of quantifier-like
expressions when they appear in non-determiner positions. For instance, we have a metaphorical interpretation of every in:
(9)

He is (the) every man.

In this case the expression every is coerced into a non-determiner position. Though this is acceptable here, such coercion does not appear
to be fully productive. For instance, substituting some or most for every
gets us markedly bad sentences.4 There are also a few expressions, like
most, that occur both as determiners and non-determiners. For instance,
we have:
(10)

a. Most heavy day (Anthony and Cleopatra IV.14).
b. Make the most of it.

(I shall not try to say what the relation between the determiner and
non-determiner occurrences is.) These may be apt for metaphorical
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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interpretation of most, though I am not sure. It seem more natural in
these cases to simply read most as expressing being great in degree,
which is one of its literal meanings. But either way, it is not occurring
as a determiner.
It might be tempting to attribute the lack of metaphorical interpretations to something about our conceptual resources. Perhaps, one
might speculate, we simply lack the conceptual resources to construct
metaphorical content around whatever meanings determiners have.
This is not the case. Conceptually, quantifying determiners measure
sizes. Take most, for instance. Most As are B is true if and only if |A∩B| >
|A \ B|. A related size measure is given by More As than Bs are C, which
holds if and only if |A ∩ C| > |B ∩ C|. Yet we can readily find metaphors
attached to expressions comparing sizes in just these ways. Here are a
few.
(11)

a. Sure he that made us with such large discourse (Hamlet
IV.4).
b. I do invest you jointly in my power, Preeminence, and all
the large effects (Lear I.1).
c. It lends a lustre and more great opinion, A larger dare to
our great enterprise, Than if the earl were here (Henry IV,
Part I IV.1).
d. It will wear the surplice of humility over the black gown of
a big heart (All’s Well that Ends Well I.3).
e. Thy words, I grant, are bigger, for I wear not My dagger in
my mouth (Cymbeline IV.2).

Metaphorical interpretations of terms like bigger and larger are commonplace.
We thus have the conceptual ability to produce metaphors with just
the kinds of size comparisons and measurements that quantifiers make.
Metaphors are not to be found when, and only when, the size comparison is expressed by a determiner. Conceptually, there is little difference
between larger and the determiners more or most, but metaphor is available with the former and not the latter.
So far, I have noted that we can make sense of localizing metaphorical interpretation to a part of a sentence. When we do, we find no
metaphorical interpretations of determiners, i.e. quantifier words. We
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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do find metaphorical interpretations of expressions with the same conceptual content, but not the determiners themselves.
A claim that there are no metaphorical interpretations is a hard one
to make, and I should admit that I know of no fully reliable test for the
lack of metaphor. But, in this case, the evidence is strong nonetheless.
First of all, informally, no one has suggested any cases where we have
any hint of a metaphorical interpretation of a determiner. We do not
seem to have any idea what such an interpretation would be like. A
little more formally, we may take Shakespeare’s corpus as a rich and
varied source of metaphors. Scanning a concordance to Shakespeare
shows 528 occurrences of every and 919 of more . . . than. I have found
none that appear to be metaphorical. With due caution, this supports
the claim that metaphorical interpretations of determiners are absent.
It is also striking that metaphorical uses of other size-measuring expressions are found all over the Shakespeare corpus. When we look for
metaphorical interpretations of size comparison, we find them easily,
but when we look for metaphorical interpretations specifically of determiners, we find none.5

2. FUNCTIONAL AND LEXICAL CATEGORIES

We have seen that determiners lack metaphorical interpretations. We
have also seen that it is the grammatical category of determiner that
seems to lack such interpretations, not the conceptual category of sizemeasuring phrase. That leads naturally to the question: what is so
special about determiners?
Determiners themselves are not all that special, but they fall within
a well known and important linguistic division between kinds of expressions. Here are some of the marks of the class of determiners. It is a
closed class, i.e. it is virtually impossible to add determiners to a language (except by the glacial mechanisms of language change), as opposed to the open classes like nouns and verbs, where new expressions
are added easily and often. Determiners do not figure into derivational
morphology, i.e. there is nothing like every-ing or every-ize. They also
have a highly restricted range of meanings: determiners express a certain subset of the available size-comparison operators. The restrictions
on their meanings hold in every language. Again, no such restrictions
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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apply to the meanings of nouns and verbs.
These are the marks of what are called functional categories. The
list of functional categories typically includes not only determiners, but
also tenses (and modals and auxiliaries), complementizers (that and
which), conjunction, and negation. Some theories include prepositions,
and some have much longer lists. These are all, like determiners, closed
classes. They are often described as those categories that provide the
‘grammatical glue’ that binds words together into sentences. This is
perhaps most natural with respect to expressions like complementizers,
which seem to serve simply the grammatical function of introducing
subordinate clauses. It is also the case for tenses, modals, and auxiliaries, which provide the frame around which the rest of the linguistic
items in a sentence are arranged. It is an increasingly common view
that this sort of frame-providing role is common across all the functional categories.6
Another feature often proposed for functional categories is that they
have either no semantic content, or have semantic content that is somehow thin. For instance, Fukui (2001, p. 392) says that they “do not have
substantive content” while Baker (2003, p. 87) says they lack “rich distinctive lexical semantics.” The idea is that functional categories primarily provide ‘grammatical glue’, while other sorts of expressions provide
the substantial content of a sentence.
This might seem plausible for complementizers like that and which,
which seem to play a grammatical role only, and do not contribute anything interesting to the meaning of a sentence. But philosophers and
formal semanticists will find it strange to say that determiners and tenses lack any ‘rich distinctive’ semantics. Indeed, if anything, the semantics of determiners is one of the more well-understood areas of semantics. A number of interesting properties of the semantics of determiners
are known, which support important linguistic generalizations, including some very likely semantic universals. This, it would seem, is as rich
as we could ever want semantics to be. Much the same can be said of
other operators, like tenses, which also display rich semantic properties.
To be fair, the quotes above are from works in syntax, and they are
not really concerned with these aspects of semantics. Even so, we have
something of a puzzle. Functional categories do have rich semantic
properties, and yet, there does seem to be something distinctive about
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their meanings. We see this when we think about the relation of their
meanings to the grammatical roles functional categories play, and the
limited range of meanings they can have. We thus would like to know
what it is that makes the meanings of functional categories different,
and why those meanings often seem ‘thin’ (at least to syntacticians).
On this question, metaphor turns out to be of some help. It shows us
one way in which functional categories lack a ‘rich semantics’ which lexical categories have. We have already seen that the lexical categories all
have metaphorical interpretations, while the determiners do not. This
generalizes to all the functional categories. By running the same sorts
of tests we ran with determiners, we see clearly that complementizers
lack metaphorical interpretations. So do negation, conjunction, and
related expressions (again, putting aside irony and over-statement).
Tenses show exactly the same results as determiners. We have lots of
metaphorical interpretations of expressions for time, but none for tenses
appearing in their grammatical positions. We have lots of metaphorical
interpretations of the past, but none for -ed.7
We thus find that metaphor can tell us something about the lexical/functional distinction:
Having metaphorical interpretations correlates with lexical
categories, while lacking metaphorical interpretations correlates with functional categories.
This correlation gives some substance to the idea that functional categories have only ‘thin’ meanings; at least, insofar as metaphor is an
instance of markedly ‘rich’ meaning, the lack of it may well count as
‘thin’. Furthermore, the correlation shows that we can use metaphor
as a probe for lexical versus functional status. Probing for metaphorical
readings of expressions amounts to probing for lexical versus functional
status.8
Let us take stock of our results so far. We have learned something
about metaphor, and something about lexical and functional categories.
We have seen that all the lexical categories can be interpreted metaphorically, but the functional ones cannot. This shows us something about
the nature of functional categories, and why their meanings are often
described as ‘thin’. It also offers us a probe—a tool—for investigating
lexical semantics and the lexical/functional distinction. We have thus
used metaphor as a way to explore some important linguistic ideas.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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We have also seen something important about metaphor itself. We
have seen a substantial constraint on what can be interpreted metaphorically. Though we have identified this constraint, in terms of the
linguistic notions of functional and lexical category, we have yet to explore what the constraint really shows us about metaphor. The rest of
this paper will begin this exploration. It will address two sorts of questions: how a constraint derived from linguistic categories may affect
metaphor, and what the extent of the constraint is. In particular, this
paper will explore in more detail what aspects of linguistic structure are
available for metaphorical interpretation.

3. THE METAPHOR AND LINGUISTIC SYSTEMS

We will now begin to explore the issues of how our constraint works to
affect metaphor, and what the extent of the constraint really is. To do
so, we will need to rely on some (I believe rather minimal) assumptions
about both language and metaphor. In particular, we will need some
assumptions about how language and metaphor are cognized, and how
the cognitive systems involved interrelate.
In this section, I shall briefly review some assumptions about metaphor and about language. I shall then use them to construct a very simple model of how metaphor and language relate. This model will give
us a picture of how our constraint on metaphor from functional categories operates, and what the extent of the constraint is. This model
will be a tool for investigation, rather than a final conclusion. I shall
argue in section 4 that it is wrong in important respects. Doing so will
help us to better understand the scope of the constraint on metaphor.
Thus, we will at least begin to address the questions before us.
The main idea we will need, both about language and about metaphor, is that the two are cognitively different. This is widely assumed.
For instance, I take it that when Lakoff (1993, p. 203) says “In short,
the locus of metaphor is not in language at all, but in the way we conceptualize one mental domain in terms of another,” he takes himself
to be advancing a well-established thesis. Of course, metaphors are
expressed using language, but whatever cognitive systems allow us to
generate and understand metaphorical interpretations are assumed to
be different from those systems specific to language. In the next two
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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subsections, I shall elaborate this idea, by filling in some background
assumptions that support it.
3.1.

Assumptions about Metaphor

In the preceding sections, I relied only on our ability to recognize metaphors and to localize them to parts of sentences. Beyond that, I assumed little about metaphor. In what follows, I shall continue to be as
non-committal as possible about theories of metaphor. In particular, I
shall not take a stand on any of the main points of contention in either
the philosophy or psychology literatures. Even so, I shall make a few
minimal assumptions about metaphor, and a brief review of these issues in philosophy and psychology will help to make those assumptions
clear. This will help to make clear the differences between metaphor
and language in cognition.
In philosophy, much of the debate has focused on whether metaphorical ‘meanings’ are the same as other sorts of meanings, i.e. if they
are ‘propositional’ in nature. A diverse group of philosophers argue
for propositional meanings, including Searle (1979), and Stern (2000).
The view that metaphors have distinctive non-propositional meanings is
championed by Black (1962), while Davidson (1978) argues that metaphors have no distinctive meanings at all. So long as we can recognize a
difference between metaphorical and non-metaphorical interpretations
of sentences and their parts, any of these is compatible with what I say
in this paper.
Another of the main issues in philosophy is the mechanism by which
metaphors are conveyed. Some, such as Searle (1979), take metaphor
to be a (Gricean) pragmatic process whereby a speaker literally says
one thing but conveys a distinct speaker’s meaning. Relevance theorists
such as Carston (2002) and Sperber and Wilson (1998), and other contextualists like Recanati (2004), assimilate metaphor to the category of
‘loose use’, or more generally to the same sorts of pragmatic mechanisms they see as involved in determining what proposition is conveyed
by a speaker. (They thereby downplay or reject any distinction between
metaphorical and literal.) Another option, suggested by Walton (1993),
is that metaphors are conveyed via a kind of pretense or make-believe
game in which speakers can engage.9
Any of these provide for a significant non-linguistic component of
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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metaphor. For a speaker to convey and a hearer to understand a metaphor requires them to rely upon Gricean or relevance or pretense processes. We may safely assume that any of these go beyond linguistic
competence. Ability to engage in make-believe, or to recognize relevance, or informativeness, or perspicuity, all go beyond our competence
with language. The same goes for semantic views of metaphor, like
that of Stern (2000). Stern sees metaphor as the result of a contextdependent operator, which has distinctive semantic properties. But the
value of the operator in context is still set by pragmatic processes which
go well beyond linguistic competence.
I thus think it is safe, and not too controversial, to assume that
there is an important difference between what goes into metaphor and
what goes into linguistic competence. Some psychological abilities and
processes are required for the conveying and interpreting of metaphor
that go beyond competence with words and phrases.
Assuming there is such a difference, we might ask what the cognitive
processes involved in metaphor interpretation are like. The Gricean and
relevance-theoretic views do tell us something about these processes, as
they hold that they are essentially the same processes that are involved
in other aspects of communication. It is natural to conclude that they
place the cognition of metaphor within general intelligence, as presumably that is where our abilities to maximize information or optimize
informativeness across a wide range of subject-matter are to be found.
The same can be said for Stern’s semantic view, which relies on such
cognitive resources as our ability to judge salience. Views like Black’s,
which rely on a notion of metaphorical meaning, likewise see these
meanings as arising from systems of concepts interacting in some ways.
Again, we may assume that whatever cognitive processes go with generating or using such systems are not linguistic in nature. All of these
views place the cognitive processes used to interpret metaphor squarely
outside of linguistic competence, and in the realm of highly general
cognitive abilities.
Many of these philosophical accounts of metaphor are proposed as
highly idealized models, or as rational reconstructions, of our ability to
understand and convey metaphors. Even so, they do at least strongly
suggest some predictions about the genuine real-time processing of metaphor. For instance, Searle’s Gricean picture predicts that the inter-
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pretation of metaphor goes through the literal meaning of an utterance; a prediction that has been much-debated in the psychology literature.10 Though I do not really want to dwell on the details of the
psychology of metaphor, a brief glance at the leading ideas there will
help substantiate the difference between linguistic competence and metaphor cognition.
The leading psychological models of metaphor comprehension all
rely in some form or another on our abilities to work with concepts:
to compare them, to generalize and abstract from them, etc.11 For instance, one leading model (the category-transfer model in the terminology of Camp, 2006) starts with a given concept and abstracts from features of a prototypical instance of it, to form an ‘ad hoc category’. Such
a category is a general schema of concepts associated with the prototype. This category is then transferred to a target concept, typically a
literal content. So, for instance, Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) discuss
the metaphor My Job is a jail, which they see involving the formation
of an ad hoc category from a stereotypical instance of being a jail. Such
a category includes being unpleasant, confining, punishing, etc. This
category is then applied to the concept provided by my job, to produce
the metaphor.
Other models rely on our ability to compare concepts, and find
shared features between them (feature-matching models, in the terminology of Camp, 2006). These models often rely upon our ability to
judge salience, to restrict metaphor interpretation to salient shared features. Ortony (1979) suggests that metaphor is marked by an imbalance
in salience, where the shared features are highly salient with respect to
one concept, but not the other. Finally, some models rely on combinations of both sorts of abilities, such as the structural alignment model
of Gentner and Wolff (1997), which proposes a stage where features of
concepts are matched, and then one where a system of such features is
formed by abstraction. (It is often suggested that this theory captures a
great deal of what Black (1962) had in mind.)
Any of these models is based on our ability to work with concepts:
to match their features and judge salience with respect to them, to recognize prototypes of them, or to abstract from them. Again, we see that
such abilities are not language-specific, and are not part of linguistic
competence. We see consistently in both philosophical and psycholog-
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ical approaches to metaphor that the cognition of metaphor is part of
our general ability to work with concepts, and not part of linguistic
competence.
I shall label whatever is responsible for the cognition of metaphor
the metaphor system. Our brief survey of ideas about the metaphor
system in philosophy and psychology shows that it is safe to assume the
metaphor system is distinct from linguistic competence. Beyond that,
our survey leaves open just what the metaphor system is. It may be that
the metaphor system is really just our most general cognitive system for
working with concepts, or it may be a more specific part of that system.
For our purposes here, we do not have to say any more.12
3.2.

Assumptions about Language

I have concluded that the metaphor system is squarely in the conceptual
realm, and distinct from linguistic competence. In doing so, I have
already tacitly relied on some assumptions about language that I shall
now make explicit.
I need to say enough about the cognition of language, specifically,
about linguistic competence, to make clear that it is different from what
we saw with the metaphor system. Our competence with language does
not appear to be a matter of our general abilities to work with concepts: to sort similarities between concepts, to make abstractions from
them, etc. Rather, linguistic competence is a highly specific ability, with
its own specific organizing principles. (Indeed, it seems that we vary
quite a bit in how well we comprehend metaphor, and generally how
effectively we can work with concepts, while core language competence
such as syntax shows remarkable uniformity in mature speakers.) Having this ability is typically described as the result of possessing a dedicated language faculty which determines the principles. This view is, of
course, forcefully advocated by Chomsky (e.g. Chomsky, 1980, 1986b).
Chomsky frequently describes a language faculty as a ‘mental organ’: a
cognitive system that is special-purpose in much the same ways that organs like the heart and kidneys serve special purposes. Such a cognitive
system is also frequently described as a ‘module’ in cognitive architecture, and indeed, the Chomskian view does posit many of the features
that are characteristic of modularity in the sense of Fodor (1983). The
language faculty appears to be highly domain specific, its operation is
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mandatory, its workings are relatively inaccessible to consciousness, it
shows characteristic patterns of development and breakdown, it has
some features of informational encapsulation, etc. Even so, it is important to note that the Chomskian view does not make language an
input module in Fodor’s sense. (See Higginbotham (1987) for further
discussion.)
I am generally sympathetic to a Chomskian view of language, and
I shall often talk in Chomskian ways. However, to bear out the idea
that metaphor and language cognition are different, we need only a
few minimal features of the Chomskian view. So long as there is a
distinct linguistic system, with principles not derived from abilities to
work with concepts like abstraction and feature comparison, we have
what we need. Assuming that linguistic competence is a matter of having a language faculty (in a mature state) guarantees this, but so would
any other way of seeing distinct kinds of cognitive systems. If you want
to insist, for instance, that the difference between linguistic competence
and the metaphor system is a matter of learned abilities to apply more
useful strategies in different kinds of settings, I need not argue against
you here. (I would elsewhere!)
A number of other features of the Chomskian package are not at
issue here, and can be ignored for our discussion. I shall say nothing
about acquisition, either of language or of the ability to comprehend
metaphor. I shall thus say nothing about questions of innateness. I
shall also say nothing about linguistic universals and variation across
languages, and issues of internalism and so-called ‘I-language’ versus
‘E-language’.
With all these caveats about not needing the full force of the Chomskian view, I shall continue to talk about the language faculty (and I still
think this is the best way to think about linguistic competence). There is
one further issue about which I do want to be somewhat more careful.
Even amongst people like me, who accept the general Chomskian view
of the language faculty, there is lively debate about just what goes into
it. As is common, I shall assume that syntax and phonology are within
the language faculty. I shall also assume that in a very minimal way,
some ‘semantics’ fall in the language faculty as well. More specifically, I
shall assume that some structural representations relevant to meaning
fall within the language faculty. In fact, these tend to look more like
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syntax than like semantics once we find them (and hence, they are often described as part of the syntax-semantics interface). The sorts of
things I shall assume to be within the language faculty are thus what
we may loosely call ‘grammar’. Importantly, though I shall talk about
semantic properties within the language faculty, I am not assuming that
these properties suffice to determine what is intuitively said by a sentence. Though (pace relevance theorists) I am inclined to think they do,
it will not matter here. The only aspects of semantics we will talk about
here are the ones that look like grammar.13
We have now identified two cognitive systems: the metaphor system
is responsible for the comprehension of metaphors, while the language
faculty is responsible for linguistic competence. I shall often talk about
the latter as the linguistic system, to make it easier to talk about both
at once, and to de-emphasize unneeded aspects of the Chomskian view.
We have seen a few features of both systems, but what we really need
is simply that they are distinct.
3.3.

The Linguistic–Metaphor Systems Interface

I have now reviewed why it is safe to assume that there are distinct
cognitive systems at work in linguistic competence and metaphor. Once
we have these systems, we know that they must interact, from the obvious fact that metaphors are expressed in language. Thus, there must be
some way in which the two systems talk to each-other, or in the usual
jargon, interface. I shall suggest that our constraint on metaphor from
sections 1 and 2 is best seen as a facet of this interface.
I shall sketch, for discussion purposes, a simple model of how this
interface might work. I shall focus on the issue of how a metaphorical
interpretation gets assigned to a sentence, uttered in a context. The
structure of the sentence, its sound, and the basic properties of the
words in it, are determined by the linguistic system. This must then be
operated on somehow by the metaphor system, to produce a metaphorical interpretation. For this to happen, the right information from the
linguistic system must be passed to the metaphor system. The metaphor
system must then act on whatever it takes in from the linguistic system,
to produce a metaphorical interpretation of the sentence.
A natural and simple model of how this might happen is as follows.
As the metaphor system is part of our ability to work with concepts,
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only the conceptually rich elements of linguistic meaning suitable for
abstraction, feature comparison, etc., are passed to the metaphor system. All other aspects of a sentence are stripped away in the interface.
To make this vivid, let us think about what the language faculty
might produce. Here is a simplified version of one proposal for the
syntax of an all-too-familiar sentence:
IP
DP

I

Julieti

′

VP

I
is j

SC

V
tj

DP

ti
D
the

NP
sun

The details of this structure are not really important.14 All that matters
is that linguistic theory tells us the structure of this sentence determined
by the language faculty is very rich. In particular, it contains all sorts
′
of things I have not explained, like subscripted t i and t j , IP, I and SC,
which could not be operated on by the metaphor system. Our general
system for manipulating concepts could not make sense of these technical language-specific notions.
We thus suppose that the metaphor system ignores all the structural
parts of the sentence provided by the language faculty, and simply selects the concepts associated with the lexical items Juliet and sun (the
boxed elements in the tree). Only these are passed to the metaphor
system in the interface, leaving for the metaphor system simply:
〈JULIET , SUN〉
(I shall indicate concepts by SMALL CAPITALS.) The interface between the
linguistic and metaphor systems, according to this idea, is one of generally erasing all linguistic structure provided by the linguistic system,
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and selecting only concepts linked to lexical items for processing by the
metaphor system.15
As this model of the linguistic–metaphor systems interface is the
simplest reasonable one, let us call it the simple model. The simple
model does have some plausibility. At least, it is quite plausible that lots
of linguistic structure generated by the language faculty must be erased
in the interface. The simple model simply takes the strongest available
position on how much is erased.
The simple model faces many challenges, and ultimately, I shall argue it is wrong. But there are some shortcomings of the model which
really show no more than that it is incomplete. I shall mention one that
is particularly relevant to the issue we are examining here. The simple
model is incomplete in failing to describe how complex metaphors can
be part of larger sentences. Many of the metaphors we have already
seen, for instance in (7) and (11), get their significance by building
metaphorical interpretations into larger messages expressed in part by
normal linguistic means. As we have seen, complex metaphors in sentences involving functional items like determiners are like this. At the
very least, this means the simple model must be extended to provide for
interaction in both directions across the linguistic–metaphor systems interface. Metaphorical interpretations must be fed back to the linguistic
system for completion and packaging, at least.
In taking the strongest available position on what is erased in the
linguistic–metaphor systems interface, the simple model captures the
constraint on metaphor we found in sections 1 and 2. Along with everything else outside of concepts linked to lexical items, elements of
functional categories are erased in the interface with the metaphor system, according to the simple model. The model thus predicts that functional categories cannot have metaphorical interpretations, as they are
rendered invisible to the metaphor system by the interface.
The simple model is fairly modest in how much it explains about the
constraint. It does not address why functional categories are erased in
the interface, even though some of them—like determiners—have the
kinds of contents which can have metaphorical interpretations when
expressed by lexical categories.16 But even so, it does give us a model of
how the constraint works: it works as a constraint on the linguistic–metaphor systems interface, rather than, say, as a constraint on metaphor
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processing itself. It also offers an answer to the question of how far the
constraint really goes. It implies that anything outside of the concepts
linked to lexical items, and so anything that could count as linguistic
structure, will fail to have metaphorical interpretations. More strongly,
any such structural elements will be invisible to the metaphor system.
Though I think an interface model is the right way to model the constraint, I shall argue in the following section that this latter prediction
is incorrect. I shall show that there are aspects of linguistic structure,
importantly similar to functional categories in some respects but appearing within the lexicon, which must be available to the metaphor
system. Thus, the simple ‘erase practically everything’ model must be
replaced with a much more selective model of what gets passed to the
metaphor system in the interface.

4. METAPHOR AND LEXICAL STRUCTURE

We have now seen that functional categories cannot be interpreted metaphorically. This shows us something about functional categories, and
it provides a constraint on metaphor. In the last section, I suggested this
constraint is best understood as a constraint on the linguistic–metaphor
systems interface, and I sketched a simple model of the interface which
accounts for the constraint.
The main goal of this section is to argue that the simple model is
wrong. In particular, its prediction that no aspects of linguistic structure are passed from the linguistic system to the metaphor system is
incorrect. We already have seen reasons to think the simple model is inadequate, and at least needs to be extended, but this will show that the
simple model is really on the wrong track. It will show that the model of
erasing all aspects of linguistic structure at the linguistic–metaphor systems interface must be replaced by one where some but not all aspects
of linguistic structure are selected by the metaphor system. Showing
this will help us to better understand the extent of the constraint on
metaphor we have uncovered.
I shall substantiate this claim by showing that some structural elements related to lexical meaning must be available to the metaphor
system. The main argument about metaphor will be given in section
4.4. Before this can be done, however, I shall have to present some
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ideas about linguistic structure in the lexicon in sections 4.1 and 4.2,
and then revisit the simple model in light of those ideas in section 4.3.
4.1.

Linguistic Structure in Lexical Meaning

Some aspects of the meanings of words have something to do with linguistic structure—with grammar—while others do not. If you want to
know the difference in meaning between fear and frighten, a linguist
will have something interesting to tell you, and what they say will be
mostly about structure, indeed about grammar. In contrast, if you want
to know the difference in meaning between red and blue, you will have
better luck asking a psychologist.
There is not anything close to universal agreement over what makes
certain things fall within the purview of linguistic analysis. But here is
the sort of picture with which I shall work. The picture supposes that
lexical meaning is a combination of two sorts of factors. One is linguistic structure, which can be mapped and explained by a good linguistic
theory. The other is more idiosyncratic and conceptual, and not the sort
of thing linguistic theory proper is likely to shed light on. The main difference between fear and frighten is structural: it has to do with which
argument is the experiencer. The main difference between red and blue
is conceptual: it has to do with whatever goes into our grasp of colors.
We label this idiosyncratic from the point of view of linguistic theory
(not from psychology in general), as it is not something we can organize or explain within linguistics itself.17
The structural side of lexical meaning has a lot in common with
functional categories. It consists of a small number of elements, determined by the linguistic system. They have contents, but like functional
categories, these contents tend to be abstract in nature, and typically
need to be completed by idiosyncratic features of lexical meaning to get
us what we think of as the meaning of a word. We have already found
tempting the assumption that this sort of content is home-grown in the
linguistic system (though this is not essential to the arguments presented here). In contrast, idiosyncratic content represents established
points of interface between the lexicon and general conceptual systems.
Again, we may remain neutral on just how that interface works, though
it is tempting to think of the lexicon as containing pointers to the relevant concepts. I shall continue to use the term idiosyncratic to describe
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the non-structural or conceptual side of lexical meaning, with the reminder that it means only idiosyncratic with respect to linguistic theory.
(Ultimately I shall argue that both structural and idiosyncratic contents
can be inputs to the metaphor system, so it is best not to insist on only
one being conceptual.)
I shall work with a specific example of this sort of approach to lexical meaning: the theory of aspectual classes of verbs. This theory has a
fine pedigree, stemming from ideas of Aristotle, through work of Ryle
(1949) and Vendler (1967), to the extensive development by Dowty
(1979), and many others. This theory, like pretty much everything in
lexical semantics, is highly controversial. But it is an established approach to some important aspects of the lexical semantics of verbs, and
it is sufficiently well-known to provide a familiar example. Also, as we
will see, it helps us to focus on some important data we can apply to
questions about metaphor. 18
4.2.

A Brief Tutorial on Aspectual Classes

Before getting to the issues of metaphor that are our main concern,
I shall quickly review some of the basics of the theory of aspectual
classes. I shall be very brief, and gloss over a number of disagreements about how the theory should be formulated, and criticism of it.
My presentation will fairly closely follow Rothstein (2004). Other extended discussions include Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2005), Smith
(1997), Van Valin (2005), and Verkuyl (1993), as well as the classic
Dowty (1979). See any of these for references to the extensive literature.
The theory of aspectual classes is a theory of verbs. It groups verbs
into four classes.
States: love, know, have, . . . .
Activities: run, walk, swim, . . . .
Achievements: die, recognize, . . . .
Accomplishments: paint a picture, draw a circle, . . . .
Different versions of the theory propose slightly different classifications,
but this traditional one will suffice for our purposes. It has also been a
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matter of intense discussion whether these are properly classes of verbs
or of verb phrases. I shall ignore this issue, and shall continue to talk
about classes of verbs. (See the references above for discussion.)
Verbs generally describe events.19 When they do so, they describe
events in certain ways, with certain structural features. The aspectual
classes indicate at least some features of how verbs depict events, and
are a clue to the kinds of structural components of verb meaning that
go into building such depictions. They are thus a clue to the linguistic
structure that might be found in the lexicon.
On one way of looking at them, the aspectual classes point to two
features of how events may be depicted. One is usually called telicity.
Telic verbs describe events as having an endpoint or telos, which is a
kind of culmination point for the event described. Achievements and
accomplishments are telic: describing an event as a dying or a painting
of a picture includes describing it as as having a point at which it is finished. States and activities are not telic: describing an event as a loving
or a running does not include describing it as having such a culmination
point.20
The other feature is what Rothstein (following work of Landman,
1992) calls stages. Describing an event with an achievement verb describes it as not having any temporally extended stages in which the depiction is occurring, as it describes the event as virtually instantaneous.
The same goes for states. Though they may be extended in time, they
need not be, and do not have stages in which the state is occurring.
They do not, in other words, have distinguishable parts where a process is ongoing. It is sometimes said that they are thus non-dynamic. In
contrast, both activities and accomplishments describe events as having stages where the processes described are occurring. Any event of
running or painting a picture has stages where running or painting is
happening.21
The terms telic and stages are labels for sorts of event depictions. I
shall not go into the details of how they may be analyzed.22 There are
some typical linguistic reflexes of these properties, which serve both as
tests for which aspectual class a verb falls under, and further guides to
the nature of the properties. One of the key tests for telicity is occurring
in constructions with for/in x time: telic VPs typically occur with in x
time while atelic ones occur with for x time. One of the key tests for
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stages is occurring (easily) in the progressive: states and most achievements cannot occur in the progressive, while activities and accomplishments can. The literature includes a number of other tests (many from
Dowty, 1979). For instance, the so-called ‘imperfective paradox’ can
help distinguish activities from accomplishments: for activities, we typically have the progressive entailing the past, while this is not typically
so for accomplishments.
All these tests have difficulties. Dowty (1979) raised questions about
the imperfective paradox test. There is a well-known class of achievements which do appear in the progressive: so-called progressive achievements such as The old man is dying. (We will make use of progressive
achievements below.) Activities can occur with in x time under ‘time of
onset’ readings, such as Mary will swim in ten minutes. Hence, the tests
must be applied with care (and hence, some controversy about how
solid classification by aspectual classes is, and about what it classifies).
Even so, we have enough to at least get an inkling of how different
verbs can differ with respect to structural aspects of their meanings.
If aspectual classes are a clue to structural aspects of verb meaning,
how do structural and idiosyncratic features of a verb’s meaning determine its aspectual class? Dowty (1979) originally suggested that aspectual class is determined by a small group of structural operators that apply to idiosyncratic contents. The operators include DO and BECOM E.
This view has been modified by Rothstein (2004) to fit into a framework
where verbs are treated as predicates of events, and she adds an event
predicate Cul and an event summing operator ⊔. (There are some technical issues about just what sort of summing operator is required, but
they will not be relevant here.) Using these, the Dowty-Rothstein proposal is that the aspectual classes correspond to the following frames
for verb meanings.
• States: [−stages, −telic].
Frame: λe.P(e).
• Activities: [+stages, −telic].
Frame: λe.(DO(P))(e).
• Achievements: [−stages, +telic].
Frame: λe.(BECOM E(P))(e).
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• Accomplishments: [+stages, +telic].
Frame: λe.∃e1 ∃e2 (e = e1 ⊔ e2 ∧ (DO(P))(e1 ) ∧ Cul(e) = e2 ).
P is an idiosyncratic content (or a pointer to one). According to this
proposal, the idiosyncratic meanings of verbs are basically stative predicates of events. Hence, the frame for state verbs has no additional
structure. Each of the other aspectual classes adds linguistic structure,
to provide for the features of the relevant aspectual class. This proposal
thus holds that accomplishments have the most linguistic structure, and
states the least.23
As given, this is more of a template for a proposal than a full proposal itself. An analysis of the operators DO and BECOM E, and an
explanation of how they generate the aspectual classes and account for
their features, is needed to fill in the template. However, I shall assume
that the basic idea behind the operators is clear enough, and that they
intuitively divide verbs along the lines the aspectual classes indicate. I
shall thus assume we may work with these frames as a model of how
idiosyncratic and structural elements may enter into a verb’s meaning.
I do so guardedly, as we have already seen how controversial a proposal
like this is bound to be.
This theory of verb meaning gives at least a little substance to the
picture of lexical meaning discussed in section 4.1. It locates an idiosyncratic part of a verb’s meaning, indicated by P, which is a point
of interface with the general conceptual system. It also locates structural elements which provide a frame for the verb’s meaning. These are
drawn from a limited stock, and appear in ways that are determined
by the linguistic system. As we have come to expect from such structural elements, they have meanings that are highly abstract, and have
as much to do with grammar as with what we intuitively think of as
meaning.24
4.3.

The Simple Model and Lexical Meaning

Now that we have at least a rough idea of how structural and idiosyncratic elements might appear in the lexicon, we need to return to the
simple model of the linguistic–metaphor systems interface. The simple
model proposes to erase anything that could count as linguistic structure, including such functional categories as determiners that do have
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some contents associated with them. Anything distinctive of the linguistic system is stripped away in the interface, according to this model.
In describing the simple model in section 3.3, I said that it simply
selects the concepts associated with lexical items (of genuine lexical
categories!). Now that we have seen that within the lexicon, we also
have structural elements, we need to refine our statement of the simple
model to take these elements into account.
If the simple model is to erase any structural elements provided by
the linguistic system, it must do more than simply target lexical items.
It must target the parts of lexical entries that provide idiosyncratic content, and erase the structural frames in which these idiosyncratic contents appear. The simple model should be refined to pass to the metaphor system only those elements within the lexicon we represented
above by P.
To take an example, the lexical entry for the achievement verb die
is (BECOM E(DEAD))(e), where DEAD is the idiosyncratic content of the
state of being dead. The linguistic system depicts this content with the
verb die as an achievement, rather than, say, a state. According to the
simple model, all that is passed to the metaphor system from die is the
idiosyncratic content DEAD. Thus, the interface between the lexicon and
the metaphor system, for this case, looks something like:
(BECOM E(DEAD))(e)
w
w
w

DEAD

On this model, everything but the idiosyncratic content is erased in the
interface with the metaphor system.
The simple model, thus refined, is an appealing picture. As we discussed in section 3.3, it reflects the idea that the metaphor system is
part of our broad ability to work with concepts, and so only conceptually rich elements should be passed to it by the linguistic system. Thus it
proposes to erase all structural elements, including those within the lexicon. As I also mentioned, the simple model is very aggressive in what it
erases. It erases structural elements that have genuine contents, including functional categories and elements like BECOM E. If we continue to
speculate that these elements have contents that are home-grown by the
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linguistic system, this aggressive model might seem natural. It erases
anything distinctive of the linguistic system, and passes to the metaphor
system only those elements that are naturally part of the broader conceptual system to begin with. It essentially proposes that the interface
to the metaphor system is exactly the interface from the lexicon to the
conceptual system.
Though this is very natural, I shall now argue it is wrong. I already
mentioned that there are many reasons to doubt the simple model. But
the ones I shall offer in the next section show it to be on the wrong
track.

4.4.

Metaphor inside the Lexicon

We may now finally get back to metaphor. To show the simple model
is wrong, I shall argue that metaphorical interpretations of verbs can
be sensitive to aspectual structure, and thus, the linguistic–metaphor
systems interface must pass information about the structural frames of
verbs we reviewed in section 4.2 to the metaphor system.
Unfortunately, my arguments for this conclusion must be somewhat
indirect. Unlike the case of functional categories we explored in sections
1 and 2, it is impossible to simply point to some element of aspectual
structure and ask if it is interpreted metaphorically. We cannot do this,
as aspectual structure is buried within the lexicon, and is not visible
in such a way that we can directly localize metaphorical interpretation
to it. Instead, I shall argue that we can see properties of metaphorical content that reflect aspectual structure, and in particular that we
can isolate differences in aspectual structure that lead to differences in
metaphorical content. This, I shall argue, is best explained by a model
which passes elements of aspectual structure to the metaphor system.
To do this, I shall examine a couple of verbs in detail, looking both
at their aspectual structures, and the metaphorical interpretations they
receive. I shall begin with the verb blush, which has received substantial
discussion in the literature. It is an especially useful case, as it allows
for a cross-linguistic comparison that will help to isolate aspectual from
idiosyncratic content.
Blush is an activity verb. We can run a few of the standard tests to
show this.
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• For/in:
(12)

a. Mary blushed for an hour.
b.

* Mary blushed in an hour.

(Indicates −telicity.)
• Occurs (easily) in progressive:
(13)

Mary is blushing.

(Roughly indicates +stages.)
• Progressive entails past:
(14)

One of the reasons for focusing on the verb blush is a much-discussed
cross-linguistic comparison that shows structure in the lexicon at work.
The Italian translation of blush, the verb arrossire, is a faithful translation of idiosyncratic content, but is an achievement rather than an
activity verb.
Conceptually, blush and arrossire have the same (idiosyncratic) content. They both describe the reddening of the cheeks. For both English
and Italian speakers, this is the result of a bodily process, it is associated
with embarrassment, and induces the same patterns of responses. As
far as idiosyncratic content goes, the two verbs really are the same.
Even so, arrossire is an achievement verb (Levin and Rappaport Hovav, 1995; McClure, 1990). Here are some tests.
• For/in:

Mary is blushing ENTAILS Mary blushed.

(16)

(Distinguishes activities from accomplishments. Further indicator
of telicity or related properties.)
We thus know a little about what the internal structure of blush is
like. It has the frame of an activity verb, and so has a lexical entry
like(DO(RED CHEEKS))(e), where RED CHEEKS is the idiosyncratic content
that goes with blush. The English verb blush describes an activity of
DOing (or being) red in the cheeks.
There are lots of metaphors with blush. Here are a few, many drawn
from Shakespeare, as usual:
(15)

a. The sun of heaven methought was loath to set, But stay’d
and made the western welkin blush (King John V.V).
b. Let my tears stanch the earth’s dry appetite; My sons’ sweet
blood will make it shame and blush (Titus Andronicus III.I).
c. The windows blush with fresh bouquets (Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table).

These are all metaphors of personification (cf. Lakoff and Johnson,
1980). As such, they have more content than simply saying that the
object in question is red. (Note: welkin means sky. The Titus Andronicus
quote is part of a complex extended metaphor of personification of the
earth that runs throughout the whole scene.)
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a. G è arrossito in un secondo.
G has blushed in one second.
b.

* G è arrossito per 10 minuti.
G has blushed for 10 minutes.

• Progressive does not entail past:
(17)

G sta arrossendo DOES NOT ENTAIL G è arrossito.
G is blushing DOES NOT ENTAIL G has blushed.

(Data from McClure (1990) table 4.) Thus, arrossire has a different
frame from blush, even though it has the same idiosyncratic content.
We have:
(18)

a. Blush: (DO(RED

CHEEKS ))(e).

b. Arrossire: (BECOM E(RED

CHEEKS))(e).

Even without a full semantics for the DO and BECOM E operators, this
makes vivid what the structural difference is. Italian represents the
event as one of becoming red in the cheeks, whereas English represents
it as a doing of being red in the cheeks. Different languages can make
different choices about how to depict the same idiosyncratic content, by
putting it in different frames.
Vol. 3: A Figure of Speech

31

Michael Glanzberg

Now we have two verbs, blush and arrossire, which have the same
idiosyncratic content but different structural frames. The simple model,
which simply selects idiosyncratic content, predicts that we should see
the same metaphors with the two. But this is not so. Rather, we find that
metaphors with the two verbs typically reflect their aspectual structures.
Compare:
(19)

a. The sky blushed.
b. Il cielo arrossí.

These express metaphors of personification. The simple model says they
should have the same metaphorical content, but speakers report that
they do not, as they report that the aspectual structure of an activity is
part of the metaphorical content in (19a), while the aspectual structure
of an achievement is part of the metaphor in (19b).
Such judgments, however, do not tell us quite enough. I have found
that, especially if a target sentence is surrounded by other text, informants are sometimes willing to import event structure into a metaphor
from clues in the surrounding text, rather than from the target sentence
itself.25 So, we would like to sharpen our evidence to show that it is the
aspectual structure of the verbs that is responsible for the difference in
metaphorical content. This will help show that aspectual structure is
passed from the linguistic to the metaphor system.
One further test we can run to do this involves putting the verbs in
sentences that highlight, or even require, specific aspectual structure,
such as the kinds of sentences that we use to test for aspectual structure
in the first place. If the simple model were right, and metaphor interpretation ignored aspectual structure, then we might expect metaphorical interpretations to be available for sentences that place a verb in an
environment that typically does not allow its aspectual structure.
This does not happen. Consider:
(20)

a. Mary blushed all day long.
b.

* Mary arrossí tutto il giorno.

These are word-for-word translations, but the Italian version is judged
unacceptable. The temporal modifier is acceptable with an activity but
not an achievement.
Metaphor of personification does not change this:
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a. The sky blushed all day long.
b.

* Il cielo arrossí tutto il giorno

If (21b) were acceptable, it would support the simple model. But its
failing to be acceptable does not yet show the simple model is wrong.
It does not, as its unacceptability may simply be an effect of grammar,
independent of metaphor interpretation. It may be, for instance, that
metaphor interpretation works the same in both the English and Italian cases, but then the linguistic system takes over to build a sentence
around a metaphorical interpretation, and that rules out (21b) as ungrammatical.
To try to control for this, we need to try to correct the sentence
for grammar, with as little change as possible. Asking an informant to
replace (21b) with an acceptable sentence gives:
(22)

Il cielo restó arrossito tutto il giorno.
The sky stayed blushed all day long.

My informant reports this is an acceptable sentence.
Even so, my informant reports that (22) is only marginally intelligible for meaning, in spite of being a metaphor. Yet if metaphor interpretation ignored aspectual structure, metaphorical interpretations
of (22) should be readily available. At the same time, the marginal
intelligibility is nicely explained by supposing that the metaphorical interpretation interprets the verb arrossire with its achievement structure.
We thus have some evidence that metaphor interpretation not only reflects aspectual structure, it is sensitive to the aspectual structure of the
verb it interprets. We have evidence that aspectual structure is passed
from the linguistic system to the metaphor system.
We get similar results when we look at cases where we can force a
phrase to get interpreted as within two different aspectual classes. One
example is that of progressive achievements: cases where an expression
that is normally an achievement is able to appear in the progressive, and
the whole progressive construction is interpreted as an accomplishment.
(Recall, usually achievements cannot occur in the progressive at all.)
For instance:
(23)

a. John died.
b. John was dying.
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In (23a) we have an achievement, while in (23b) we have an accomplishment.26
The idiosyncratic content of the verb is the same in both cases, but
even so, there is a difference in meaning corresponding to the different
aspectual classes. This difference is clearly preserved in metaphors of
personification, as we see with:
(24)

a. My idea died.
b. My idea was dying.

Informants give me consistent judgments of difference in meaning between these two (regardless of whether or not I also show them instances of metaphorical versus non-metaphorical interpretation, or of
non-metaphorical progressive achievements).
The simple model predicts we should have the same metaphorical
contents available for (24a) and (24b), as both have the same idiosyncratic content. Thus, we again have evidence that the simple model
is wrong. The two sentences in (24) do have different inflectional
structure, as one is in the progressive and the other is not. But this
is more linguistic structure, of just the sort the simple model erases. So,
as far the simple model goes, these sentences should pass exactly the
same content to the metaphor system, and thus should receive the same
metaphorical interpretations. This is not what happens, so the simple
model must be wrong.
The evidence we have seen from arrossire versus blush, and from
progressive achievements, gives us good reasons to think that metaphorical interpretation is sensitive to aspectual structure as well as idiosyncratic content. Thus, the evidence gives us good reasons to think that
the simple model is incorrect. However, an alternative explanation of
the data we have just seen remains available to the simple model, which
exploits the potential extension of the model I mentioned in section 3.3.
It might be that the data we have seen is not the result of aspectual
structure being passed from the linguistic system to the metaphor system. Rather, it might be that the metaphor system operates only on
idiosyncratic content, as the simple model says, but it then passes the
metaphorical interpretations of idiosyncratic content back to the metaphor system, where it is placed back in the same structural frames it
was taken out of. Thus, the whole metaphorical sentence might reflect
aspectual structure, but because of effects generated on the linguistic
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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side rather than the metaphorical side of the interface. This is not exactly what the simple model proposes, but it extends the simple model
in a way that does not undermine its basic point.
I shall now argue against this alternative explanation directly. To
do so, I need to sharpen our results still further. I need to show not
only that we find our understanding of a whole metaphorical sentence
to be sensitive to aspectual structure, but that there are features of the
metaphorical interpretation of particular expressions which would not
make sense unless the metaphor system had access to aspectual structure. Thus, I shall sharpen our results to show that the metaphor system must see operators like DO and BECOM E. The strongest claim
one could make here is that these operators themselves can receive
metaphorical interpretations. I shall argue directly only for the weaker
claim that the metaphor system must have access to these operators. I
am inclined to think the stronger claim is true, and the evidence I shall
provide does make it seem plausible, but the evidence I have so far is
not quite sufficient to really establish it.
The argument I shall advance focuses on an indirect effect on interpretation with the modifier when I looked at him/her/it in its punctually
locating sense. This modifier applies to achievements and to states, but
not to accomplishments and activities (excluding the onset of activity
reading). When applied to achievements, it typically triggers an implicature of causal agency on the part of the speaker. For instance:
(25)

a. John died when I looked at him.
b. Mary arrossí quando la guardai.
Mary blushed when I looked at her.

Though the verbs in question are not themselves causal, all of these
indicate that the speaker had some causal effect relating to the outcome.
(In the Italian case, I am told, this implication is very clear). This effect
is generally absent for states:
(26)

a. John was dead when I looked at him.
b. John was happy when I looked at him.
c. John knew me when I looked at him.

We do not typically see the implicature in any of these. (We might
generate it with enough additional contextual information, of course.)
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I have labeled this effect an implicature, and it shows the signs of
being a conversational implicature. It is, for instance, cancellable in
context. It is perfectly coherent to say John died when I looked at him,
but it was not my fault.
The ready availability of the implicature for achievements but not
states suggests that a key trigger of the implicature is aspectual structure. Here is one rough story about how such an implicature might
arise. The frame for achievements, but not states, includes a BECOM E
operator. This contributes content to achievement sentences. Though it
is highly abstract and structural in nature, it is enough for us to assume
that normally, something BECOM ES only if it is caused to become. We
also, in cases like (25), have enough information to tend to infer that it
is the speaker who did the causing. We hence wind up with the implicature of the speaker causing the outcome in (25). In contrast, states have
no operators in their frames, and in particular no BECOM E operator,
so we do not draw this implication in (26). The precise details of how
the implicature is calculated will not really matter. All that is important
is that it relies on aspectual structure.27
Given the kinds of data we have already seen, it should come as no
surprise that this effect is preserved in metaphorical interpretation. We
see the implicatures with metaphorical interpretations of achievements,
as in:
(27)

a. My idea died when I looked at it.
b. Il cielo arrossí quando lo guardai.
The sky blushed when I looked at it.

Likewise we do not see it with metaphorical interpretations of states, as
in:
(28)

a. My idea was dead when I looked at it.
b. My idea was happy when I looked at it.
c. My idea knew me when I looked at it.

Regardless of whether the interpretation is metaphorical or not, we get
the same pattern of typical implicatures.
So far, this is effectively more evidence along the lines we have already seen. But if we pursue the implicature of speaker causation in
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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metaphor a little further, it will help us to identify an important aspect
of metaphorical interpretation.
To do so, we need one more independent piece of the puzzle: an observation about how causal notions can get interpreted metaphorically.
In some cases causal expressions can themselves be interpreted metaphorically, even if they have extremely thin or ‘light’ meanings. We see
this with make in:
(29)

The sun of heaven methought was loath to set, But stay’d and
made the western welkin blush (King John V.V, repeated from
15).

In this example, make is part of a complex metaphor of personification
(and a rather elegant metaphor, often missed in a not-much-loved play).
Obviously blush is interpreted metaphorically to produce this complex
metaphor; but furthermore, I shall argue, make is interpreted metaphorically as well.
The metaphorical interpretation of make is somewhat difficult to
detect, as the literal meaning of make is already very broad and ‘thin’,
and can apply quite liberally to all sorts of situations. Taken literally,
make can describe all sorts of relations between celestial bodies. For
instance, it appears to be literal in:
(30)

This kind of cloud makes the Moon turn red.28

In our extended metaphor (29), we see something different. This metaphor describes an event of making in a personified sense: making in
the sense of what a guest staying too long does when he makes his
host blush. This is not merely causation, as it includes content specific
to human agency and human responses. This goes beyond the literal
meaning of make, which is a clear sign that make is interpreted metaphorically as part of the metaphor of the sun and sky personified.
For more evidence that we can give make a metaphorical interpretation involving agency, consider:
(31)

The huge cardinal made my head hurt.

This sentence has a non-metaphorical reading. Depending on the context, it might be understood as conveying something like Thinking about
the huge cardinal made my head hurt. But it also has a metaphorical interpretation, where it is the cardinal (number!) itself that makes the
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speaker’s head hurt. This is a very natural reading of the sentence. In
it, we see a personification not just of the cardinal number, but of the
action the cardinal takes. This again involves a metaphorical interpretation of make involving human agency.
The availability of multiple readings for (31) suggests another test:
(32)

*/?? The sun made the sky blush and the temperature rise by
10 degrees.

This sentence is bad, or marginal at best, which is evidence that the
overt and elided occurrences of make receive different readings. The
first overt one receives a metaphorical reading of human agency, while
the second elided one does not.29 We may conclude that make can be interpreted metaphorically in the course of a metaphor of personification,
in spite of having a highly general and abstract literal meaning.
Now, we are ready to put the pieces together and make the main
argument. From the observations about implicatures of causation and
about metaphorical interpretations of causal notions, we can argue that
BECOM E must be available in metaphor interpretation. First, we have
seen that the implicature of the speaker causing the outcome in the construction in (25) requires the BECOM E operator, and is typically not
present without it. (More generally, the implicature requires the right
aspectual structure from the verb.) This implicature can occur with either metaphorical or non-metaphorical interpretations. Furthermore,
from our observation of metaphorical interpretations of causal notions,
we may conclude that in metaphors of personification, the implicated
causal relation between the speaker and the outcome may also be interpreted metaphorically. In (27), the implicated causal relation receives
the same kind of metaphorical interpretation that make does in (29).
The implicature in these cases is not merely that the speaker enters into
some causal relation leading to the outcome. As part of the personification metaphor, the implicature is enriched to include that the relation
is the kind that occurs when one person induces another to blush. The
causal relation is itself interpreted as personified, just as we saw with
make.
This shows that the metaphor system is active in generating the implicature of causation. As this implicature is generated in part by the
presence of the BECOM E operator, we may conclude that the metaphor system acts on inputs including this operator. Thus, the linguistic–
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metaphor systems interface must make the BECOM E operator available to the metaphor system. The metaphor system sees BECOM E (and
perhaps other elements of aspectual structure). This is enough to show
that some elements of linguistic structure are passed to the metaphor
system. Hence, the simple model, which proposed that all elements of
linguistic structure are erased in the interface, must be wrong.
I believe it is plausible that the BECOM E operator itself receives
a metaphorical interpretation in metaphors of personification, with the
same enriched content as the causal notions receive. It is, I believe, interpreted as becoming in the sense that people become flushed, rather
than the abstract sense of becoming that is the operator’s literal content. I have not explicitly argued for this stronger thesis, but instead
for the weaker thesis that the metaphor system must in some way have
BECOM E available. The weaker thesis is slightly easier to substantiate,
as the implicature of causation has a much more specific content than
the highly abstract BECOM E operator, which makes it easier to provide evidence that the implicature may be interpreted metaphorically.
It might be possible to find related arguments for the metaphorical
interpretation of other elements of lexical structure. For instance, if
we accept analyses of causal verbs which include a structural element
CAUS E, then we might run similar arguments to show that this element
can be interpreted metaphorically. I shall leave this task to another occasion.
I shall conclude this section with one final conjecture about how the
metaphor system can make use of aspectual structure. Metaphor can
add aspectual structure. Consider:
(33)

The patient is blue.
Metaphorical interpretation: the patient died.

Assuming that this is indeed a metaphorical interpretation, it represents
the event mentioned in (33) as an achievement, even though being blue
is a state.30 The metaphor system is thus able to add its own aspectual
properties. This does not tell us anything directly about how the metaphor and linguistic systems interface, but it does show that the metaphor system itself must have concepts available for aspectual properties.
This does not by itself guarantee that the interface will pass aspectual
elements to the metaphor system. We have already seen that functional
categories are not passed, even though the metaphor system has availVol. 3: A Figure of Speech
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able concepts corresponding to their contents. But it at least suggests
that the metaphor system can understand aspectual elements, and so it
can receive them from the linguistic system.
I have now made my case that the metaphor system must see aspectual structure. I have provided evidence that aspectual structure
affects metaphorical interpretation, and that specific metaphorical interpretations require the metaphor system to have aspectual structure
available. Though I grant that this evidence is somewhat indirect, I believe its most plausible explanation is that aspectual structure can be
passed to the metaphor system in the linguistic–metaphor systems interface. Thus, some linguistic structure, within the lexicon, is visible to
the metaphor system.
This shows that the simple model, which supposed that all elements of linguistic structure are erased in the interface, is wrong. Some
elements of linguistic structure, including functional categories, are
erased; but some, including aspectual structure in the lexicon, are not.31

5. RESULTS AND SPECULATIONS

We can break the results of this paper into three groups: results about
what kinds of elements get interpreted metaphorically, results about the
notion of functional category, and results about the interface between
the cognitive systems responsible for metaphor and language.
First, what gets interpreted metaphorically. We have seen that though
expressions of the major lexical categories can be interpreted metaphorically, determiners, tenses and other functional categories cannot. This
is so, even though lexical expressions with substantially the same contents as functional expressions can be interpreted metaphorically. We
have also seen some reasons to suspect that elements of aspectual structure within the lexicon might also be capable of metaphorical interpretation, but the evidence I have presented here does not fully decide
this.
Second, the notion of functional category. The correlation between
functional categories and lack of metaphorical interpretation shows that
we can use the availability of metaphorical interpretation as a probe
for functional versus lexical status. At the same time, the availability
of metaphorical interpretation gives some substance to the idea that
www.thebalticyearbook.org

Metaphor and Lexical Semantics

40

functional categories have only thin meanings. However, the metaphor
probe works only at the categorical level, to distinguish functional from
lexical categories. It does not offer an across-the-board test for structural versus non-structural status, as the possibility remains open that
functional structure within the lexicon might be interpreted metaphorically. Even so, the notion of functional category is an important one
in its own right, and metaphor can be a tool for exploring it.
Finally, the interface. The fact that expressions of functional categories cannot be interpreted metaphorically, even though correlate
terms of lexical categories can, is a substantial constraint on metaphor
interpretation. I argued that it is best understood as a constraint on the
interface between the cognitive systems responsible for linguistic competence and metaphor comprehension. Functional categories cannot
be interpreted metaphorically because they are not passed to the metaphor system in the interface. I went on to explore how extensive this
constraint is. I considered a simple model of the linguistic-metaphor
systems interface, which proposes that all linguistic structure is erased
in the interface. I argued this simple model is wrong, as some features
of linguistic structure within the lexicon must be visible to the metaphor
system.
What should replace the simple model? We cannot at this point say.
Even so, we can conclude that the interface between the linguistic and
metaphor systems is highly selective about which structural elements it
passes to the metaphor system, and which ones it does not. It selectively
erases functional categories (categorical linguistic structure) but passes
aspectual structure (lexical linguistic structure) to the metaphor system.
At the very least, the interface must look something like:
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Again, the syntactic analysis of the sentence has been simplified. The
important point is that the metaphor system somehow targets lexical
elements, including structural and idiosyncratic content in the lexicon,
and ignores functional elements. The simple model offered an elegant
and natural story about functional categories, but we have seen that at
least this more complex selective model is required.
I do not have a good explanation for why the linguistic–metaphor
systems interface works this way. It is a topic for further investigation. However, one speculative point is worth mentioning. Somehow,
it appears that components of lexical meaning, even structural components, have some feature that makes them visible to the metaphor system when functional categories are not. There is already a suggestion in
the literature which might indicate what that feature is. Higginbotham
(1985, 2000) and others have proposed that all lexical categories include an event argument, while functional categories do not.32 It is easy
to speculate that the metaphor system might be sensitive to whether or
not something is involved in describing eventualities. If the linguistic
system encodes this feature of describing eventualities in terms of having an event argument (or perhaps related properties like assigning or
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Versions of this paper were presented at A Figure of Speech: Conference on
Metaphor, University of Latvia, Riga, 2007; the UC Davis ‘Salon’, 2008; and the
Paris-Stanford Conference on Meaning, Context and Communication, Stanford
University, 2008. I am grateful to all the participants at those events for valuable
discussions. Thanks also to Robert May, Adam Sennet, Paul Teller, and Michael
Wedin for discussions and comments on earlier drafts, and to Greg Damico
and Francesca Merlin for judgments and help with Italian. The students in my
classes at UC Davis in Fall 2008 also provided judgments. Finally, special thanks
to Liz Camp for answering my many naive questions about metaphor.
Notes
1

This point is made elegantly by Stern (2000).
We can also dispense with any strong claim about literal meaning here. What is important is that we can recognize a contrast between more or less literal and metaphorical,
and localize it to parts of sentences. I am a firm believer in literal meaning, and shall talk
about it throughout this paper. But so long as we suppose that we can recognize some
cases of metaphor, weaker assumptions about the literal would suffice.
3
There is a substantial debate over whether every determiner expresses a quantifier,
or if there is a distinguished subclass of quantifying determiners. There are also nondeterminer quantifiers like adverbs of quantification. I shall ignore these issues here.
4
In traditional lists of figures, the use of a term outside of its category is often labeled
antimeria.
5
I have relied on the Opensource Shakespeare concordance of Shakespeare’s complete works, at http://www.opensourceshakespeare.org/concordance/. I should mention
that Shakespeare’s English is in some important linguistic ways different from ours. For
instance, we find such constructions as:
2

(i) Two glasses where herself herself beheld (Venus and Adonis 1151).
This is not modern English. Regardless, the determiner system in Shakespeare’s English
seems to be close enough to modern English to make Shakespeare’s metaphor-rich texts
a good place to explore what metaphors are available.
6
You can see this in any recent syntax text, or in the important discussion of Grimshaw
(2005a). The leading idea is that both noun and verb phrases live inside larger syntactic
structures built up from functional elements. Where we would have intuitively looked
for a sentence, for instance, this view holds that we have an inflection or tense phrase:
a phrase built around the functional category of inflection or tense. Lexical elements fall
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under these superstructures. Particularly, verb phrases fall under inflection phrases, while
noun phrases fall under determiner phrases. See Fukui (2001) for an overview.
7
I have so far said nothing about the status of prepositions. It is a matter of some
dispute in the syntax literature whether they should be counted as lexical or functional.
Since Chomsky (1970), it has been common to see the lexical categories as themselves
defined in terms of two features: ±N and ±V. Prepositions correspond to [−N, −V].
Though this typically leads authors to include prepositions on the list of major lexical
categories, it is done with some ambivalence. For instance, Chomsky (1981) presents
this feature system, but then says that only the nouns, verbs, and adjectives are lexical
categories. But this appears to be an off-hand remark, having more to do with traditional
terminology than a really substantial claim. Chomsky (1986a) presents the same feature
system, and counts all four categories, including prepositions, as lexical. In work taking
the distinction between lexical and functional categories more seriously, we see Baker
(2003) arguing explicitly that prepositions are functional, and Hale and Keyser (2002)
highlighting their mixed status. The reason prepositions are such a difficult case is that
some prepositions, or some occurrences of some prepositions, seem to play an entirely
grammatical role, while some do not. The prepositions expressing thematic properties,
such as dative to expressing recipienthood, seem functional in nature. Other prepositions,
including prepositions expressing spatial position like in, may appear to be lexical.
When it comes to metaphor, we get the same sorts of mixed results. Thematic prepositions like dative to do not generate any metaphorical interpretations. With prepositions
like in, the situation is less clear. There are abstract uses of in like:
(i) John is in trouble.
These are often glossed as having metaphorical interpretations of the spatial relation
of being in (cf. Quirk et al., 1985). However, it is not entirely obvious whether this is
metaphor, or rather a highly abstract meaning of in. (To itself has locative uses implying
directionality, for which similar questions can be raised.) At least, in these cases, we get
mixed results about metaphor just where we have a mixture of functional and lexical
characteristics.
8
There are a number of more technical ways that lexical and functional categories
may be distinguished. Semantically, functional categories tend to have the semantics
of operators. Syntactically, functional categories do not discharge or assign theta-roles,
while they do bear agreement features (cf. Fukui, 2001). In some frameworks, not relating to theta-roles and having the semantics of operators come to pretty much the same
things. The metaphor probe can work in conjunction with these more theoretical ideas,
as it gives us a more intuitive test, and a more intuitive indication of what is different
about the semantics of functional categories. Even so, the speculative suggestion I shall
make in section 5 may indicate that theta-roles and metaphor have a great deal to do with
each-other.
9
For a survey of philosophical issues about metaphor, see Reimer and Camp (2006).
10
See Camp (2006) for discussion and references.
11
Concept may not be the best term to use here, for two reasons. First, not every view
of metaphor cognition sees the units of cognition as playing the same roles that concepts
traditionally play. Second, many views of metaphor work with larger-scale elements of
cognition (such as scripts or schemas). Even so, these differences will not be important for
the little I shall say about psychological models of metaphor cognition, so talking about
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concepts will be harmless.
12
My debt to Camp (2006) in this section should be very obvious.
13
For a taste of the debate about semantics in the language faculty, see Larson and
Segal (1995) and Pietroski (2003).
14
I have followed the proposal of Moro (1997). It might be surprising to some how
much controversy there is over the syntax of such an apparently simple sentence. For an
overview, in a more recent syntactic framework, see Mikkelsen (2005).
15
For the moment, we may avoid the issue of how lexical items link to concepts. I shall
discuss some aspects of the lexicon in section 4, but I shall generally skirt the question
of whether lexical entries themselves contain conceptual information, or rather contain
some kind of pointers to concepts. The interface model we are considering can work with
either.
16
A tempting speculation that would fit with the simple model is that though the
meanings of expressions like more and bigger are related, the genuine lexical categories
include links to the broader conceptual system, whereas the functional ones have homegrown contents provided by the language faculty itself. However, the reasons the simple
model fails I shall present in section 4 show that even if this speculation is correct, it
cannot account for the interface behavior we see. At least some home-grown linguistic
contents do get passed to the metaphor system.
17
Though most anything in lexical semantics is controversial, this picture has emerged
from a wide range of research. Here is a representative statement, “The argument I will
make is that semantic properties of predicates divide into two fundamentally different
kinds of information. I suggest that the division corresponds to the distinction between
information that is linguistically analyzed and information that, while it may be cognitively analyzed, is linguistically atomic. The argument is based on the idea that some
meaning components have grammatical life, and some are linguistically inert. There is a
sense in which this position is a distillation of a general research trend . . . ” (Grimshaw,
2005b).
18
For more critical discussion of the theory of aspectual classes, see Levin and Rappaport Hovav (2005) and Verkuyl (1993).
19
Sometimes events and states are distinguished. If so, then verbs describe a broader
category of ‘eventualities’ including both.
20
I have put this in terms of how a verb depicts an event, and so put the difference
in the verb’s meaning rather than the event itself. Whether or not there is a difference
between events answering to properties like telicity depends on just how finely events are
individuated. Fine-grained event individuation will see the differences we are discussing
here as differences between events, while coarse-grained event individuation will not. As
our main interest here is in the meanings of verbs, we need not take a stand on this issue.
21
Many theories of aspectual classes recognize another feature of punctuality. With
it, they identify an additional class of semelfactives like kick and wink, which are nearinstantaneous, but not telic. See Smith (1997).
22
See Rothstein (2004), who builds on work of Krifka (e.g. Krifka, 1998) and Landman
(1992).
23
Ultimately, Rothstein (2004) proposes a more refined analysis of accomplishments.
24
Some approaches to lexical meaning make structural elements even more syntactic.
See, for instance, Hale and Keyser (2002).
25
In a few tests I ran, I found that about half of my informants were able to interpret
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extended metaphors even when the temporal information in the surrounding text and
the aspectual structure of a target sentence conflict. Many who could not found the
metaphors infelicitous.
26
For more on the internal structure of progressive achievements, see Rothstein (2004).
27
The implicature is not generally present in progressive achievements. We do not see
it in:

(i)

a. John was dying when I looked at him.
b. Mary stava arrossendo quando la guardai.
Mary was blushing when I looked at her.

However, this does not have a punctually locating reading. Rather, it locates a stage of the
accomplishment, i.e. a stage of a DOing rather than a BEC OM I N G. This does not trigger the implicature. The analysis of progressive achievements of Rothstein (2004) does
include a BEC OM E operator in a much more complex frame for them, but it relates to
the culmination of the accomplishment, which presumably does not support the inference
that the speaker is responsible for the becoming.
28
Example from http://science.nasa.gov/headlines/y2004/07jul_bluemoon.htm.
29
Thanks to Adam Sennet for suggesting this line of argument. Stern (2000) argues that the badness of sentences like (32), which employ conjunction reduction to mix
metaphorical and literal interpretations of a single expression, is evidence that metaphor
should be treated semantically. Camp (2005) argues against this interpretation of the
data; I take no position on the issue here.
30
One alternative interpretation of (33) is that it literally states a fact about the patient’s skin color, and thereby implicates something about the cause of that state. Even so,
it does sound on par with other metaphors to my ear, and I suspect that other examples
are even less vulnerable to this worry.
31
In related work, Asher and Lascarides (2001) argue that metaphor processing itself works on highly structured lexical entries, represented in their framework as typed
feature structures. They argue that there is a substantial constraint on metaphorical interpretations derived from these structures, which shows that certain structural features of
verbs cannot be changed in metaphorical interpretation. In particular, they argue that the
structural features that distinguish the class of change of location verbs are preserved in
metaphor. Likewise Stern (2000) notes that the thematic structure of a verb is preserved
in metaphorical interpretation, and that thematic structure can trigger metaphorical interpretation of a verb’s arguments.
32
For discussion of nominals and adjectives, see Grimshaw (1990) and Larson (1998).
33
This might also be an argument for Higginbotham’s thesis about event arguments.
Those of us coming from a more Montagovian tradition are rather cautious about this
claim, but at least indirectly, the evidence I have been discussing here may well support
it. It also would bear out the idea, mentioned briefly in section 2, that assignment and
discharge of theta-roles is the key distinguishing feature between lexical and functional
categories.
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